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FOREWORD

,,.

The Governor's Committee on AdminhJtrative Organization is composed of
twelve members - - four members of the Colorado Senate, four members of the
of the Colorado House of Representatives and fc.1ur citizen members.

Although each

has hac! a considerable experience in or with the administrative organization and
functioning of government at the state 1.tvel in C~orado, it was deemed advisable to
establi,sh a beginning point common to

---

a.11. Furth-el=, in recognition of the previous

efforts to improve administrative organization in thj.s state, the committee decided

__ ,-

to have a review made of these effoi--ts a11,d thli:~ accc.>mplishments,

And, finally,

I,

there was the realization that thro\l.ghout tne country similar committees have
studied (or are studying) the organizational structures in their own states and that
some have met with considerable success in bringing about more efficient and economical state gove:,;nment while others have not been so fcrtunate.

Thus, the Cclo-

_,.,
rado committee was anxious to review the procedures and methods utilized by its
counterpart in those states in which the efforts were fruitful in order to profit from
their experience, and alsc to inform itself as to why in other states the efforts were
fruitless---and thus seek to avoid making similar errors in its own undertaking.
The task of researching the above was accepted by Dr. Leo C, Riethmayer,
"
'

.

Chairman of the Department of Political Science and the Graduate Curriculum in

_}

Public Administration of the University of Colorado in cullaboration with Dr. Laird

v

Dunbar, Instructor in Political Science at the University.

The Governor's Commit-

tee is, indeed, fortunate to have had two such capable professional men work with
it in this effort, and the committee wishes to express appreciation to Dr. Rieth/'

mayer and Di-. Dunbar for their efforts in preparing the report on "Administrative
Reorganization in Colorado".

2J

By the Governor's Committee on Administrativtt Organization.
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ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION IN COLORADO

I.
THE PRESENT ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM

The general administrative expansion at the state level for the citizens of
Colorado has resultc.:d in a near-fantastic growth in both the number of services
offered ·by the state and the number of agencies e~:tabliohed to perform these serIn 1950, the Council of State Gc,verntr.ents found that Colorado's administra-

vices.

1/
tive structure contained nine "m.ajor deparnients" and 131 "independent agencies."
Since the time of that survey the state has 1:--een engaged in what may be termed
"piecemeal" reorganization with the result that the 1950 figurts give a ,1ery inaccurate picture of the present structure.
In other words, it may b..:.- sai.d that there still exists a vast, sprawling, complicatcd adrninistrative organiz~tti.on, characterized by a bewil<kring multiplicity
of agencies which ar~. in thc:r ovm turn, marked by an astounding diversity of
organizational forms and ~.cg!'.;:;es of accoc.ntability.
The problem viewed soie:y in terms of the :1u:·:1.ber of agencies involv8d is im'·

mensc.
To be added to this factor oI pure nu.T;ber however, are at least three others.
While in fact these points are E-om"'what inttr:r-el;::i.ted, :hey r..--:.ay be artificially separated here for examination.
In the first place, the governor's limited power in such vital matters as the
choice of heads of his administrative departments, bucgeting, and fiscal control - -

'
l/

Reorganizing St;c".tc Gov<;;rnn1ent, The Council of State Governments, Chicago,
1950, p. ll.
-1-

not to mention actual "command power" - - complicates the general administrative
situation,

Administrative efficiency and effectiveness are so difficult to achieve

under the optimum organizational conditions, that to complicate the matter further
by the possibility of administrative heads of different view - even a different party-

,.t,

\
than the chief executive, is to put the problem in the class of the near.insolubles .
....;,..

r;.

At best,· about the most that can be hoped for i~ that the various department heads
will see their way clear to follow the le,,d of an energetic governor for the furtherancc of their own ambitions.

I _.,

Similarly, the present budget sitl\c?~tion leaves much to be desired both in regard to administrative effoctivenc ss and pcliti'.:al accountabi!ity.

Instead of follow-

ing the generally 2-cc-~!pted practice of making the budget office something lik\,; the
'•

1

chief staff aid to thE: executive, t!-le present system is one in which the state budget
officer is "off in a corner" of the hie:tar-:hy ar.d relatively independent of the state's
chief executive.

'

A second problem stemming from the multiplicity of administrative aglc!ncies
turns not so much on thL fa.;t that there :::.re so 1n2.ny agencies as on the :manner in
which these agencies arc orga;.1izcd in relc.tion to each other.

They are not arr an-

ged in any logical grouping - least of all are they arranged into anything which might
be said to relate to the function to which they purport to be organized.

In other

words, that administrative concept which students of pt:blic administration have
come to call "unifunctional organization' 1 2.ppe2.rs to be com.:pktely ignored.
Completely aside from such $Upposed ad·.,antages as the monetary economies
which might possibly be dfocted by the removal of the opportunity for wasteful
duplication of effort with its attendant dissipation of manpower and material, and

-2-

I •

.....

.j:

the full utilization of technical assistance, there remains, over and above these,
a most important benefit of unifunctional organization.

.'· -

Lines of authority and

accountability between the executive and the administrative agencies arE; clarified
at the expense of such expendables as "buck-passing" and th<c! n:yriad other forms

,_

Ii

of political and administrative accountability.

T~1e citiz;;;.a can more easily deter-

'

""

..

mine the ·weak links in th(; unifunctional form of organiz:::ttion than he can in th<:!
heterogenous pot-pourri that is now :rresented hirn.

And he can mor::; ir:telligcntly

take remedial .:..ction :J.t the pclls .

., •
It should be pointed out that dirrim:.tio!1 of dupEcation may or may not effect
savings in the taxp2.ye!'S I rnon,~y, so fa.r r.s the tctal amot;.nt is concerned.

It ::.s

reasor.able to expect, h::iwGve:: tr.at more service :.)er unit of mor:.ey sp(.;nt would be
attainr~d by organiz,1ing along lin<~s rel:ited to the function.., performed.
A third factor, 2.pnrt £ror:1 sh!c!1c:r number of agencies in•_rolved, is the absence
' ..:

of adequate ovtrall staff ar.:.d 2.ux:ilia.:-y agencies.

It seems reasonable to presume

that some 0£ the morr; gross ef1'ccts of such a k.rga number of agencies could be
mitigated if the governor ::odd ha-.re cufficient assist.:mce to keep track of them- enough assistance to permit hirr1 to be "in more: places at the sar.1e time.

11

The con1plexities of modern government 2.re such that it is a physical impos..,

sibility for a goverr._or tc;perform adecpately th~ constitutionally assigned task of
wielding the "supr.~me executive authority"

8.S

weE as the ceremonial, social and

political chores which also fall within his purview.

It might evt;n be sc:.id without

irony that th~~ present aciministrative organization rr:_ak;cs even the adequate fulfillment of the administrative !'espo:1.sibility alone impossible.
An overall general staff agency could pro•:idc, (.:;Ven under the present organi.

,....:.

zation, means by which th~ state 1 s chief executive officer co;ild, at least, obtain

• -3-

-the information upon which he could base such administrative changes as he is able
to make, as well as a rudimentary machinery for keeping the administrative departments and agencies responsible,
A "cabinet", it should be added does not meet the need h~re.

Its functions

lie at what might be called the policy level, and it is naive to assume that departm(.:nt heads whose legal duties are full time can furnish the governor with the precise and detailed information needeq whe:i. they themselves are without the proper
"arms of management"- administrative research aides, personnel officers, and

r:,

fiscal and budgeting ascistants.

t~ ~

THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM OF COLORADO PRESENTS, THEN, AT
LEAST FOUR FACE TS: THERE IS AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF AGENCIES: THE
POWER OF THE GOVERNOR TO CONTROL EVEN A LESSER NUMBER IS INADEQUATE: THE AGENCIES ARE NOT SO ORGANIZED AS TO BENEFIT FROM THE
PERFORMANCE OF SIMILAR FUNG TIONS; THE GOVERNOR DOES NOT HA VE THE
AID THAT HE NEEDS TO FURNISH HH,1 THE NECESSARY INFORMATION AND

-..-

ADVICE HE WOULD NEED TO PERFORM HIS CONSTITUTIONAL TASK - IF HE
HAD THE POWER TO DO SO.
THE SUM IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM OF NO MEAN PROPORTIONS--

-

tf.:.

ONE WHICH THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE, 1,.CTING THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVE AND PRIVATE GROUPS TO WHICH THEY BELONG, HAVE FROM
TIME TO TIME TRIED TO CORRECT.
BEEN GOOD.

THE RE3ULT OF THESE EFFORTS HAS

WHILE THERE IS MUCH TO DO, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT

MUCH HAS BEEN DONE.

-4_,

•,

II.
DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
IN COLORADO.

In the years since Colorad.o joined the Union in the Centennial year of 1876,
the state has maintained a steady growth in population,

The census of 1880 gave the

,-

state a total of 194,327 persons.

By the year 1930, there were mere than a mil-

lion persons in Colorado and the 1950 figures were i, 325,089.

The estimated pop-

ulation in July cf 1953 was I, 456,000 - - an increase of nearly lOo/o since the last
official census,

While most estimates give a somewhat low<;;r figure, it is not com-

•.

pletely in the realm of fantasy to suggest that by around 1960, the state's p---pulation

,,_

will have increased ten-fold since cbt aining statehood.

·.

In 1953, only six states

1/
were increasing their population nt a foster r.:itc than Cokrado.
Like the naticn, Colorado is growing, and increased popul:i.tion inevitably
leads to increased neec fc-r administrative services and facilities.
The administrative services rendered by the state of Colorad-:.; have expanded,
as have the services cf other sti'..tes, in c.irdcr te; meet the demands cf t:1c state's
citizens.

As is also true in case of the cth<.; r states, this 1:;;xpansicn has been in

three general diro.:.;cticns - or, it might be said, for three different re2.sons.

In the

first place, the state h2.s· expanded servic--~s which it has always performed; secondly, the state has responded to the needs cf its citizens by und.:::rtaking completely

-..--

new services; and, thirdly, the stat0 h.:.s ta.lc•~n ever, er perhaps, merely insisted
upon supervising, services which were being performed by the various units of

--

...

_

'•

"'

-.
--

1/

Current Population Repc:-ts, Series P--25, No. 89 {Bureau of the Census,
Washington, Jn.n.u:~ry 2.5, 1954). p. 4.

-~-

i

·.
local government.
For an example of the first type of expansion, one need only look to such
fields a'f Jligher education, and the care of the mentally ill.

The creation of var-

ious specialized schools through out the state is an exar..-Lple of the case in point schools of education, mining, and agriculture - and the very current example of
changes in the status of the Fort Lewis school is quite pertinent.

Similarly, the

old "insane asylum 11 is, happily, no longer considered adequate in the light of advancement in the fields of diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, and as a
result this field of state service ha.s been forced to expand.
Colorado is particularly rich in examples of the second type of administrative
growth.

The publicizing and promotion. of the state's abundant recreational re-

sources is an excellent case in point.

Colorado's citizens have come to realize

the economic potential of their natvral resources and their elected representatives
-:

have responded with such service's as conservation progra,ms, fish and game
stocking activities, and pro1notion2J services designed to inform both residents and
others of the extent of these services.

It is in the third type of growth that one iinds the most sensational administrati ve expansion.

The phenomena of the state, whether entirely taking over a speci-

fie function, or of insisting on so1ne degree cf control over the local units that
!:)erform the service, are universal thrcugha.t the fi-.::ld of sta.te ad1nir.istration.
~xample of highways leaps to mind.
'

·,

•

The

For decades road b1,1ilding and maintenance

-iad been viewed as a purely local function.

V/ith stimulus from the federal govern-

nent in the form of grants-in-aid, the states entered the highway field with a ven~cance.

Each year sees this activity becorn.e more and more an example of the

:._"·,1

first category - expansion of functions already performed - since the super highway

-6-

and the toll-road movements seem to ha,.ve yet to reach their maximum point of
adoption.
The fields of public welfare and relief for the needy provide still other ex-

..

'

.

amples of the state adopting responsibility for services previously considered to
be pre-eminently local in character.

►

So also, for that matter, does the adminis-

tration of elementary and secondary education.

State departments of education are

today exercising a degree; of control of local school systems which would have
been thought to be impossible a generation ago.
And so state administration has grown in response to the needs of the times
as expressed by the demands of the citizens of the state.

Colorado has had, one

may suppose, neither more nor less demand, generally speaking, than the other
states.

The proliferation of state agencies that one now finds would certainly in-

------

dicate that, at least, the demand in Colorado has not been less than it was elsewhere .

.

"-

,..

The way of meeting these demands secrn.s, again, to have been no different
in Colorado than it was in the other states.

Agencies were created by the legisla-

tu.re and "tacked on, " as it were, to the existing adn-dnistrative structure.

Some

of these agencies were placed uncler sir,gle heads; others were placed in the hands
of boards or commissions.

Son-ie of the agency hC;acis were to be appointed by the

governor; sometimes with the consent cf the Senate, so~nctin1es not,

..

......
<

.

\

new agencies were placed in existing department

~

Some of the

~ctually or merely "en paper"

while others were given a status rc::.nging from what or.e might call "sem.i-indepeni.ent" to one which is obviously free of~.::;Y_ effective executive controls.
Some of the boards which were created were really ex officio in character,

-7-

!

,, >

--

and the duties assigned these boards frequently merit a form of organization that
grants a degree of authority more commensurate with the magnitude of the activity
than can be mustered by a bc,ara composed of officials with other full-time obliga-

-

..

ticns .
Functions that in any logical arrangem~nt could be expected to be given, at
the very least, some formal machinery for coordination were left to go their comparatively independent ways.
On the personnel side, sound practices such as position-classification and
in-service training programs have been slow to find root in Colorado administration, in spite of a constitutio_nal provision for the merit system dating back to 1918.

... '

Other practices which have been ignored include the establishment of a positive
and vigorous recruiting system to draw capable young people into the service of the
state.

On the matter of finance and budgeting, the picture is no better - the state

still lacks a budget organization that can operate as an effective staff aid to the
chief executive.
The resulting situation in Colorado, as in most of the States of the Union, is
an administrative structure which, although created to fulfill the expressed wishes
of the citizenry, may actually impair the effective answering of the citizens' demands.
In other words, the problem cf meeting th0 political demands of the times has

-

·- ,...

\

left the states • Colorado, like the rest - with an organizational problem d the
first magnitude.

-i-

III
A

...
"'

REVIEW OF :PROPOSED AND ACCOMPLISHED
REORGANIZATION IN COLORADO

The legislators and the citizens of the state of Colorado have not been unaware.
of the need of reorganizing the administrative structure a£ the state's government,
and from time to time - with increasing frequency in recent years - have undertaken the task of doing something about it.

Their dforts have met with varying

degrees of success.

1/-

' ·'

The legislative session of 1915 passed an act,

establishing a committee

authorized to conduct a survey cf the state's governmental structure with an eye to
securing increased efficiency and reduced C;Xpenditures.

Composed of two Senators,

two Representatives, and three non-legislators appointed by the governor, this

..

~

Survey C ummittee on State Affairs submitted its Report in February of 1917.

The

repcrt was actually 18 separate reports on various offices and functions of the
state governmental organization,

In the main, it recommended integrating the ad-

ministrative agencies of tht: state under the governor, and it proposed a budget
system.

A budget device was adcptcd in 19 i 9 - although one not bearing much re-

semblance to that recom1n~ndcd - but no action was taken on any of the other proposals.
In 1922, after having successfully campaigned for, but not yet having assumed
the office of, governor, William E. Sweet obtained the services of two members of
the staff of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research tc undertake a study of
Colorado state organizational arrangements and to make recommendations for such

,~'

consolidation as seio·.mccl necessary.

The report, submitted to the legislature in

the form of a speech by the govenor, prcpcsed a far-reaching reorganization.

1/

Chapter 161 of Session Laws of 1915.

-9-

All administrative agencies were to be consolidated, as far as was permitted
by the constitution, into nine departments, each of which was to be headed by a
person appointed by the governor and subject also to removal by him.
ty bureaus and commissions were to be • (;liminati;d or reconstituted.

Some sevenThe: heads of

the nine,departments (Finance, TaXi!.tion, Agriculture, Mines, Labor, Trade and
..... ·'·

Commerce, Public Works, Public Welfare, and Public Health) were to act as a
"cabinet" for the governor.

The authors of the rcpurt estimated that adoption cf

the re0rganizaticn plan would lead to savings of about a h2.lf-milliein dollars annually
The chief result of the plan ~-f Governor Sweet was the introduction of a coun-

-·

ter-plan, knc.,wn as the L"-mbert Bill, which provided for some degree cf ccnsolidation.

There was to be a seven man administrative cabinet, the members of which

were to be ekcted by the people.

The Lambert plan might best be described as

something closely akin tc the type cf government foupd in commission gcverned

,..

.

'

cities .
In the legislative battle which ensue:;cl, neither p lan survived to become law.
In 1932, Ed. C. Johnson successfully campaigned for the governorship on a
platform which incluc.ecl recrganization of the stat~' s gcvernmcntal structure.

,

Upon

election, he appointed a committee, which was to be headed by ex-Governor Sweet,
and gave it the task of presenting a reorganiz2.tic.n plan.
The result was an ad1ninistrativc cede bill which attempted tc do as much recrganization as was statutorily pos sibfo.
amendments to the constitution.

.,

In acditiun the c::;mmittee proposed two

These n.:visions cf the ccnstituticn would have

provided for a short ballot, on which cnly the governor, the lieutenant governor
and the auditor would be elected - 12 department heads were tc be appuintcd - and

., "'

an amendment to ccnstituticnal civil service provisions.
-10-

Neither amendment was

acceptable to the citizens of the state.

'·
'·

The code bill had more succcs s.

Some twenty-five boards and commissions were transferred to six administrative departments. These departments were headed by elective officals as shown
below.
Executive Department

Gc-vernor

Department of Finance
and Taxation

State Treasurer

Department cf Auditing

State Auditor

Department cf Law

Attcrney General

Department cf State

Secretary of State

Department of Education

Superintendent of Public
Instruction

These department heads, with tht exepticn of the Superintendent cf Public

.

..

.

'

Instruction, were also t-::· serve as members of the executive council.

This council

was divided into three divisions - budget, acccunts and control, and purchasing with the result that the great bulk of the control of the state's fiscal matters rested
with this executive council.

The various clivisicns passed on the governor's budget,

reviewed practically all of the state 1 s purchases, and established the accounting
procedures fur all state units.
It should be notc;d that here again is s omcthing very closely resembling a com
mission form of government - one in which executive responsibility is very poorly
concentrated, and one in which a large number of agencies were merely

"'

..,

to one of the six administrative dcpartmer.ts.

11

att2.ched 11

Under this reorganization it was

nearly impossible for the elective department heads to exercise anything more
than purely nominal con.trcl over these agencies technically placed under their
J

authority.
-11-

By 1937, the inherent defects of the 1933 administrative reorganization were
becoming quite apparent, and it was widely agreed that the admitted "transitional"
features of the earlier revision needed either bolstering er, perhaps, even more
extensive changes.

--

As a re::sult of these sentiments, the nationally known firm of Griffcnhagen
and Associates was engaged to undertake a comprehensive survey of the state's

,
administrative organization.
The resulting survey was probably the most comprehensive study of Colorado
government that has ever been com piled.

The report was in 22 parts, each of

which dealt with one major administrative office or function.

Each report included

an anlysis of the various agencies involved, as well as a critical appraisal of their
functions, organization, staff and finn.ncial requirements, and procedures in addition to rec-.)mmendaticns for improvement.
The proposed reorganization of the executive branch may be summa rizcd
under six major headings.
1. Short ballot. Oniy thL: governcr was to be elected. All other officers
were to be appointed by him - with the sole exception of the state auditor,
who was to be an appointee of the legislature.

.
.. _

_

J,,

\__

'
'

\

'

2. Centralized Executive Authority and Responsibility. The governor was
to have compkte pcwer over , and full !'esponsibility for, th<.; administrative operations cf the state. He was t,_) ch,_)ose his major assistants, who
were in turn to choose their aids under civil service standards and regulations.
3. Unifuncticnal Departments. The plan prcpcscd about twenty departments, to be crg2.nized on th(:: basis of some fundam<.;ntal function of state
government; c. g. , education, health, welfare or highways. Closely related activities would be organized into divisions, headed by persons appointed by and responsibl,c; to the department head.
4. Abulition of Independent and Semi-Incl,~pendent Agencies. There is
no room in the "unifunctional'' concept for agencies independent of a .

-IZ-

responsible head, and thL: whole proposed plan of departmentalization
depended upon the abolition of agencies fre:c of such control, and the
transferring of their {unctions to one of the departments.
'-

5. The Principle of Single Responsibility. Division of authcrity was to
be avoided by never employing beards to }'><irform duties which were administrative in nature, Thosz boards for which the plan did provide:
wer,e to operate in a purely advisc,ry capacity.
6. Establishment of an Acvisory Cnbinet. The heads -:-A the various departments were also to act as the members of the governor's cabinet.
This cabinet was to be a c-::;ordin:iting body, designed tc prevent cluplicatiun and overlapping of duties, and it was also to serve as a source of
administrative information for the governor.

·~-

Although for the purposes here the Griffenhagen plan for reorganization of
the state's fiscal administrative facilities is presentec: under a separate heading,
the plan was actually part of the overall attempt to make the operations of the whole
executive branch more E:ffective.

This was to be achieved by giving the governor

both control cf, and responsibility for, the expenditures of appropriated funds.

The

fiscal plan may be summarized under two main pcints.

.

_

.

'

1. Department of Finance. The Department of Finance was to ( 1),
operate as the governor's financial staff agency and (2) be the sole
control unit for the state's fiscal operations.
The department was
to have five divisions - tax collection being left to a separate depart1nent. The divisions were to be:
1. General Supervision and Control.
2. Budgeting.
3. Pre-Auditing .
4. Control of Receivables.
5. Purchasing anc1 Prc,perty Control.

2.. Independent Auditor. This official was t::, be appointed by the
legislature and his functicn is to be rigidly limited to that of postauditing.

The only action cf a reorganizationa! nature undertaken by the 1939 legisla.tive session was to amend tht prcviskns concerning the Bu,Jget and Efficiency Com-

-missioner so as to place this official under the civil service.
•

<.

-13-

Although he was to

be appointed by the governor, he no longer was to serve at the pleasure of the
chief executive.
In the two year period from the time of the Griffenhagen report to the meeting of the 1941 legislative session, vo.rious civic groups kept warm the idea of reorganization.

The result was the Administrative Code of 1941.

This act created seven administrative depart:ments:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5,
6.
7.

--

Executive Department.
Department of the TrC::asury.
Department of Ta:ication and Re venue.
Dcp;irtment of Auditing.
Department of Law.
Department of Education.
D<,;partmcnt of St ate.

Each of these dcpartm~nts was organized into divisions, e.g., 18 in the
Executive Department, 4 in the Law Department, and 6 in Education.

In the Exe-

cutive Department was placed a Division of Budgets, the duties of which included
the preparation of the state budeet for each fiscal year of the coming two-year appropriation period, the recommendation cf inter-agency transfers of funds between
.;,

appropriations, as well as the examination and approval of work programs and
quarterly allotments of the various clep2.rtments.

The head of the division, the

State Budget and Efficiency Commissioner, was given the task of preventing duplica..;,
tion of work and function, in addition to being given the power of revising the budget
...>.

estimates of administrative agencies.

It might be noted here that the functions of

this office arc absorbed into th~ Divisicn cf Accounts and Cantrol in the: 1947 fiscal
reorganim.tion.
,_ .....

In some of the departments, the reorganization prcvidccl for the use cf boards
instead of divisions.

For example, the Department cf Education contained th(;

boards of Examin0rs and V ccational Education.
-14-

The Division of Registration,

placed in the Department of State, was to control the licensing activities of 19
boards.

,_

Included were the boards of C osmetclogy, Pharmacy, Shorthand Repor-

ters, and Medical Examiners - as woll as the Sta.te Boxing Commission.
The numerous divisions of the Executive Department were given control

,_

over still ether boards and con,missions.
..,._

Fer instance, in the Division of Conser-

vation, the reorganization plan provided for the inclusion of three ccmmis sions,
dlit; l,~;rc:l.,

and, surprisingly enough one "department. "

The code also provide,:l for the establishment of a Governor's Council, which
was to be composed c,.f the Secretary of State, the Treasurer, the Directer of
'

-

_,.. -

Revenue, the head of the Department cf Education, the Attorney General, the Budget Commissioner, the State Purchasing -·A~nt, plus

such other administrative

officers as the governor might care to chuose.
The reorganization cf 1941 must be realistically viewed as a "paper" reor-

.

,_

'

ganization.

Many agencies we:::-c either left independent of the executive authority,

or were placed under the governor's control in a ncmi?1al sense only.

An example

of the superficiality of the rec,rganization is to be found in the Division c,f Regis -:

tration of the Departrr.ent c.,f State.

This division - for which no head was prc,vided,

incidentally, - was composed cf tht beards in charge of th1.;; licensing of occupations.
Although in the Department of St<J.te, the contrcl of the head of that dt:partment, the
S_crctary of State, over these boarlls is, 2.t best, to be described as "ncminal".
A more realistic tenn would be "non-existent."

Even omitting such a considera-

tion as this, there still remained the fact that it is excetdingly difficult to maintain
the constitutional premise that the gcverncr shall exercise the "supreme executive
power of the State, " in view cf the fact that the bulk uf the members of his Council
, ,,
...,__

arc chosen on the long ballot.

-15-
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Nonetheless, the ii..dministrative Code of 1941 marks the end, fo1· the time
bjiWg, at least, d the overall approach to state reorganization in Colorado.

From

1941 until the present, the probbm has been given a piecemeal treatment.
The first step in this directiot\ was taken in 1946, when the Jub-Com.mittee
on Health of the Post-War Planning Commission, rccommend.;;cl that the Division of
Public Health be replaced by a Department of PubHc Health.

This department was

to consist of two divisions; the State Board of Health, and a Division of AdministratioJ
The Board was to have nin(; governor.appointed members. who we:re in turn to appoint the State Director cf Health to head the Division of Administration .

.

,.

,

The duties of the Board of Health, acting through the Division of Administration were to exercise control of sanitary standards of drinking water. irrigation
water used in market gardens, the treatment and disposal of sewage and trade waste

'-

·-

'

material, the inspection of dairy products. and to act as the state's dissemination
center for public health information.
,:,_.

In March of 194 7, Governor Knous signed a bill which abolished the office of
Budget and Efficiency Commissioner of 1941. and placed the fiscal administration of
the state in the hancls cf a Controller, who was to head the newly created Division of
Accounts and Control.- Thio Controller was to be .appointed under civil service regulations and was tq be acc;ountablc to the governor,

This fiscal reorganization had 5

purposes~ .

. "''

'

1. To provide a budget system through which tht: governor could
intelligently forecast the needs and resources of the state for the
corning appropriation period.
2. To provide continuous budgetary ·Cl:Jntrol !or the fund already
appropriated by the legislature.
3. To provide COlltinuous budgetary appraisal-of operating costsand the efficiency of state agencies.
-16-

4. To provide tighter internal control of expenditures as a ::::afeguard against both mismanagement and misappropriation of funds.
5. To provide an adequate record system by m(;ans of which the
other purposes of the act could be eUec..taaated.
The Accounting Section of the new Division was given the responsibility for
reorganizing the state's accounting procedureo.
During th<:! same session, the Colorado Legiolature created a tcmporaty agency, called the Committee on R1:.organization.

This committee consisted of 7

members of the legislature chosen on the following basis: majority party - two
;_,enators and three Representatives; minority party --on~ member from each house.
The committee was charged with studying the structure of the state's govern-

..

ment, with the preparation of drafts of such constitutional amendments, statutes,
or executive orders a~ might be necessary to give effect to their recomrnendati ons.

'-;

The committee reported on Jam~ary 20, 1949.

The major results of the

study, from the standpoint of administration, ..m~ be best summarized by classifying them under the type of action which was neces:::;ary to cive them legal existence.
A.

Requiring S:onstitutional Amendment.
1.

~

Article XII, Section 13.
a.. Use of the "rule of three" instead of requiring
appointment of the candidate with highest grade.
b. Exclusion of members of boards, commissions,
and other mult-hcaded bodies from the civil service,
irrespective of whether they arc paid.

-·.,,..

c;:. Exclusion of such administrative department heads
from the civil service as the General Assembly deems
necessary.

d. Creation of a Department of Personnel, with a Director choGen under civil service regulations, and subject
to removal, for cause, by the unanimous vote of the three
man non-salaried commission.
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2.

Article IV, - Section 1.
a. The Provision of 4 .. year terms for the Governor,
Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor,
Treasurer, and Attorney General.

"·
B.

Requiring Statutory Enactment.
1. Clarification o{ terminology to make the ascending order
of units read, "division, 11 "department," "branch. 11 The term
"agency" was to be reserved for any other part of the executive branch crec:ted by law.
2. Creation of a Division of Publications and Publicity in the
Executive Department.
3. Creation of a Division of Personnel in the Executive Department.

~-

4.

Creation of a Department of Agriculture.

5.

A reorganization of the Education Department.

·C.

.

Requiring Executive Order.
1. Granting foe Director of Revenue the power to establish
the collecti(m procedures for all agencies empowered to make
initial i~ollecticns.

'

·-

The 1949 session of the state kgislature responded to these recommendations
with two major actions.
First, a Department of Agriculture was created tc administer most of th<::
laws relating to agriculture.

An 3-man State Agricultural Commission was estab-

lished, and its members were to be appointed by the governor - two each from
congressional districts, and one at large frcm each major party.

The Commission

_,.__

was to act as a policy-determining and qnasi-:u<licial bcdy, as well as to b~ the
body which was to recommend t0 the governor, for his appointment, the person to
act as State Agricultural Commissioner - th,c; administrative and executive h~ad of
the department.

- 18 -

The same lt::gislature created as State Board of Stock Inspection Commis-

.

sicners to succeed an old board with similar cuties.

"\

dent for all intents and purposes from thc.c: D..-::partment of Agriculture and technically

,

This new Board was indepen -

•

placed in the Executive Department.
....

In other words, the reorganization did not com-

pletely integrate all of the state's agricultural functions.
The other major action stemming from the recornmendations was the reorganization of the Department cf Education.

A ccnstituticnal amendment was proposed -

and adopted - which established a non-salaried Board of Education, which was to be
elected on a geographical basis, from cungrcs sional districts, and one at large if the
number of districts was an even number.

This Board was to appoint a Cummissioner

of Education, who was specifically excluded from the classified civil service of the
state, and who serves at the pleasure of the Board.

The Commissioner serves as

the administrative and executive head of the Department of Education and acts as
"·

secretary for the Board.
The legislature in 1951, created the State Department of Public Institutions,
which was tc be headed by the governor.

A three-man Public Institution Adviscry

Board, serving without salary and to be appointed by the governor with the consent
cf the Senate, was to assist the governor.
The Department was to be administered by a Directur 0f Public Institutiuns,

·•·

appointed by the governor and serving as one vf his cc,nf:id(:ntial emplc,yees and at

his pleasure.
\

The other en1pkyees of the depn.rtrr,ent were placed under the state's

civil service regulations.

The general result of the act was to bring under the control and management
of one agency, the state penal institutiuns as well as such ether crganizations as the
Department of Public Welfare, the Cc,mmission for the Blind, the Soldiers and Sail-;
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ors Hc,me, and the Bureau of Child and Animal Protection.

The advantages of this

"consolidation" were dubious as most of the instit11ticns included were still primarily administered through boards for each s<:iparate institution and the mere process

'

I

of adding another department title docs not autcmatically yield efficient administration.
The same 1951 legislature amended the provisions ccncerning the Division of
Accounts and Control to provide fer an annual budget and appropriations system.

Tht_

reasons for this change was to bring the appropriations system into line with the requirements of a new ccnstitutional arnen<lmcnt which provides fer annual sessions of
the legislature.

Nothing was done, however, tc make the division - or its head, the

Ccntroller - into anything like a r..:al staff aid to the chi.::£ executive.
The 1952 session ,::Jf the legislature set up a remodeled State Department of
Highways, consisting of a State Highway Commission and a Chief Engineer.

The

commission was to be m.acle up of eight members, all resic~ents of a prescribed dis trict, to be chosen for staggered terms by the governor and removable by him for
cause.

The commission was t0 choose the Chief Engineer who was tei serve as the

chief administrative head of the department.
ThE: samt: act proclaimed that thc.:re were now ten administrative departments
of the state government:

I.
II.
III.
\_

"
J

,J.

IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.

x.

Executive ~ partmcnt.
Departn1ent cf 1 reasury.
Department of Taxation and Revenue.
Department d Auditing.
Department cf Law.
Department vf Education.
Department of State.
Department d Public Health.
Department of Ag:.:i culture.
Department of Highways .

. _,,:.-

.zo.

,..

'-

Such an administrative structure as this could, conceivably, furnish the
state with a well-integrated and :t,~sponsible machinery for handling public business.
But, as even the cursury review of reor~nization which has been presented here
would indicate, these ten departments are not exactly what they wcul<l seem to be.

'-.

Under the Department of Agriculture, {c:,r instance, one would expect to find the
,_

State Veterinarian, but he is appointed by the Board cf Stuck Inspection Commissio~
ers, themselves independent of the agriculture department.

The School for the Deaf

and the Blind is not in either the Educaticn Department er the Department of Public
Institutions.

The Division of Registration contains 19 boards and 1 commission, but

there is no head for tht: division,

There is even one headless department, Taxation

'--

and Revenue.

Thus, many activities that should be under the control of a department

are left in the hands of beards er commissi::::,ns either free of control or placed in
what has come to be the administrative catch-all - the Executive Department.
Reorganization movements in the past have helped the administrative problems of the state, but they have by no me;ans cured them - much remains to be done .

...

\

\
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IV
THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION

,

MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT
THE UNITED STATES
It appears that the first concerted effort tc, reorganize the administrative
structure of a state was an unsuccessiul citizens I committ0e attempt in the state of
Oreg en in the year 1909.

Since that first unfortunate endeavc:,r, similar moves have

been made in every state of the Union - ~s well, of course, as in the national govern-

I. ~ -

ment.

By 1950, there had been thirty-twc rc,ally significant state reorganizaticns 1/

although in a fow cases indivic.1.ual statu; had undergcn:e

the pr~cess twice.

Generally speaking, these reorganizations were conducte2 0n the basis cf a

fairly well-established and rather widely accepted set (_;f working hypotheses.
Thes~ have been well surnmec-up in The Council of State Governments' Reorganizing State Governments.
4..--'

"In our democratic society an executive branch should be
organized with tw;:; main cbjectivcs: First, it should perform
with maxiinum \.!ffectivcncss and effichmcy the tasks laid before
it. Second, it should be p8litically responsible, in practice as
well as in the0ry. 11
To make such a governme!1t ideal a reality, administrative reorganization

2/
should proceed along the following lines.
1. Consolidate all administrative agencies intc a relatively small number of unifunctit..nal ckpartrnents.
2. Establish clear lines of authcrity from thl: governcr through the
rest cf the hi+::rarchy. This may be helped by:

.J'.

1 / Reorganizing State Gcvernment. {Th<:! Council of State Governments, Chicago,
1950), p. 12.

2./ The material which follows is adcpkd frcm pps. 3-5 of Reorganizing State Government.
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a.
-.........

Using the short ballot.

b. Giving the governor the power tc appoint a.nd remove the
heads of administrative departments.

/

c. Implementing the usual state constitutions'-= pruvision for
the gcvcrne,r to have "supreme executive power" with such
specific <leleg<ltions as the power tc require repcrts and to
order investigations.
3. Give the governor adequate staff assistance.
cases, normally include:
a.

This wc,uld, in most

a personal office staff with adequate personnel.

b. a working cabinet cf department heads actually responsible
to the chief executive.
c. a central hue.get cfficcr, with the necessary power to prepare an executive budget.

- ,.

d. a central accounting systcn, with a.uthvrity to prescribe the
methcd, 2'.llccate funds, pr\::-audit expenditures, and make final settlements.
c. a central pers::innel unit tc link 2. sc:und merit system with
the executive officer for purp0ses of co0rdination.
£.

a central purchasing agency.

g. a planning agency for research, evaluation of programs, a
and anticipation of trends and future needs.
4. The eli1nination, so far as is possible, cf the use of boards, and
comn1issions, Operating agencies should be place cl under a single responsible head. If there arc any really significant quasi-kgislativc or
judicial functicns, a beard may be justified, but unly then.
5. An auditor independent of the gc,vcrncr, with the scle function cf
performing the pest-audit and rcpcrting it to the legisktor.
The Council of State Gcvcrnments gees on to say that,
"These principles and others c'.erived from them have been
applied rather consistently by the practitioners of administrative
reorganization. These were reiterated by the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937 and confirmed and
exp2.ndec1 by the Comr.1issicn en the Organization of the Executive
Branch of the G,.,-., ernm-~nt (the Hoover Commission} in 1949. They
-63-

have supplied the framewcrk for me;s t of the recent reports and
recommendations by committees studying the problems of state
government crganizaticns." '}._/

,.

It should not be assumed that these concepts are infallible commands to

·•.

,

' .,.

groups undertaking administrative rccrganization.

N::,,r should it be assumed that

there is universal agreement upon the validity - or practicality, for that matter of all of these hypotheses.

It must be conceded, however, that as working as sump-

tions they have led to successful reorganization at all levels cf American gc,vern:nent, from towns and villages to the government cf the nation.
At the state level, which ccncerns us here, the record has, on the whole,

'
>een promising, especially in the post war years.
1

.ertaken post-war

\.

'

2.. Gministrative

As cf 1953, thirty states had un-

surveys of ~,arying breadth and depth.

In a review

::1ade in 1952, Karl Boswcrth, cf the University of Connecticutt, found that twenty-

.,,.:

our of these states had hac1. a chance ta consider reorganization repc•rts, while sur-

4/
·eys were still in progress in the remaining six.
Of the two dozen which had been given reports, nine states either rejected
hem entirely or adopted so little uf them that the general response must be classi.;

•

.

L

ied as a negative one.

In two states, New Hampshire and New Jersey, the bulk of

he proposals were adopted by the legislature.

In the remaining thirteen, a crudely

•eighted scale showed ad0pticn of from, roughly, 30- -50% of the suggested changes.
While it seems pointless here to go intv a point~by-pcint review cf the recomtlmdations made, and the changes adopted, in the various states, it might be perti-

.. ...
:nt

'

to ask the question,

11

Why weren 1 t these att(;mpts mere successful?

For the

11

.ucity cf results achieved by rcorganizc:.ticnal surveys in the various states raises
,me delicate questions concerning the entire questicn of administrative recrganiza-

,·

"

:, .

~

..

.. .1 '

;;,.

.Ibid,- page 5.
'T"f Karl A. -Bosworth, "The Politics of Management Improvements in the States,
47 American Pclitical Science Review. pps 84-99, 84.
-241
' /

.

'

11

~...

~

f,

tion.

r· ..
"

The answers to these questions woul<l be indications of the essential considerations for success in accomplishing the reorganization of the administrative facilities of a state.
In.the first place, it is quickly seen that neither the need for reorganization,
nor the excellence cf the suggested changes, seem to have any relation to success of
the reorganization plan.

•·

In other words, the reorganizer quickly finds that legisla-

tive bodies are usually not as eager f:)r far-reaching recrganization as he and his
colleagues are.

When these basic facts of life become clear, the reorganizer, all

too often, raises the pl~intive cry, "Politics!

11

shrugs his shoulders and believes

that he has hit upon an acceptable excuse.
The actual truth of the matter seems to be that the reorganizer, in order to
do his job well, must alsc face the hard fact that the rcalizatic,n of reorganization
is more a

11

political 11 business, than it is an

11

2.dministrativ~" or "scientific" process.

After facing the fact he must make his cverall pl.ans account for it.
It is exceec.ingly difficult, of course, to outline in detail th".: necessary steps
which must be taken in order to insure the fruition of a sound reorganization schemesuch a plan must be different in 6fferent states, fer instance.

It does seem possi-

ble, however, to indicate several factors which must be taken into consideration in

5/
attempting to bring a reorganization plan to the statute bocks.
To begin with, it is obvious that one cannot afford to ignore the fact that the
'-

'

existing institutions represent something cf a balance cf power between organiza-

'

'
I

ticns which are closely akin to vesttd interest.

Therefore, the reorganizer should

w

,'

5/ The organizaticnal scheme as well as much c-f the material of what follows is
taken from Bosworth' s 2..rtick.
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,

~

I,

actually c:xpect - at the very least,re,.sh~::culd net be surprised by - a negative re .. ,

•.,;,.

sponse from the legislature.

Even when the rcorganizaticn is technically confined

to the executive branch of the government, cme n1ust remember that individual members of the legislature may have a very i-t:al ,itake in cn0 er more of the departments

-

and agencies tc be reorganized.

These departments may handle matters of special

interest to the legislators' constituents, or, it is possible, may be staffed with personnel in whom the legislator has personal interest.

In any event, the reorganizer

has no right to expect his plans to receive an open-handed legislative welcome.
Secondly, the reorganizer cannot afford the luxury of ignoring the general
temper of the times.

}-

Bosworth reaches the setmingly scund conclusicn, that,

"When horizons are low because of despair-., it is easy to reason
that any change is unlikely to wcrsen conditi(;ms and may improve them
(e.g., Nebraska's shift to unicameralism and ether depression changes
in important state policy). When horizcns are wide with general optimism, the risks.of c.ny change seem lessened (c. g., the many changes in
the period from the late 1890s tc Wcrld War I. 11 f_:_,/
Using these two prepositions as general assumpticns concerning what might
be called the environment cf reorganizati-:m, the discussion can then continue under
six majcr headings given by Bosworth.

I.
II.

The Relation of Reorgn.nizz.ticnal Motives and Probable Su cress.
Sponsorship and Success.

III.

Composition and Organizaticn cf the R~organizing Ccmmissi on.

IV.

Organization, Scope, and Method of the Sur·,ey.

,'
V.
'

Presentation of the Report and Recommenc1.ations.

Vi. Considert..tic.n cf the Legislatc.,rs' Views of the Proposals.

.,
~

~/ Bosworth, loc. cit., pp. 85-86.

_,
.. Z6 -

...

•

I.

ii

"...

/·

Motives and Success.

To undertake a scheme of reorganization with any

other motive than that of procuring improved public administration, seems to be a
virtual guarantee of negligible results.

As Bosworth sa} s , to merely "get into the

act" and set up a reorganization plan simply because other states are doing it seems
.,.

to pre doom the attempt to failure through lack of public support.

•.

,;

Similarly, the use of reorganization commissions in an attempt to "take the

'

neat off" an embarrassed administration not only appears to insure the failure of
the move, but seems to tend to undermine the public's confidence in any future, sin-

i

cere, attempt to obtain better public management.
What seems to be necessary is a group of responsible state political leaders
with sincere good faith in trying t<;> get improved administration of the state's affairs .
.iuch a group has the necessary public contacts and influence to give the reform the
popular support it needs for passage.

At the same time, it can present the leaders

with the not necessarily incongruous opportunity to advance their own careers and
further the desires of their constituents.
It might be well to add here that the pure economy motive seems to have !al.en into disrepute.

In the first place, state tax systems do not seem to hurt large

md politically significant groups - as docs, say, the national income tax or the lo-

... '
·..._

:al property tax.
10

guarantees that administrative reorganizations will necessarily result in tangible

nonetary savings.

.

'

•...

It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, for example, the

~fficiency of a reorganized public health service in terms of dollars and cents .
11.

, ,·

A point perhaps even more important is that there seem to exist

Sponsorship and Success. As Bosworth points out, the perfect hypothetical

,ituation is one in which the reorganization re.forn1 is sponsored by the "out" party,
which manages to win the succeeding election and become the "ins 11 , and then proceed
-27-

to put into effect the reorganization plan which they had sponsored.

It is regret-

.....
J

table that reorganization never seems to come Gff.'in quite this prescribed manner -

-.
· ,

at least, we have no record of any states in which this pattern came to pass.
It is equally regrettable, perhaps, that there seems to be; no prescribed pattern of sponsor ship which seems to insure the adoption of reorganization plans.
S·ubernatorial sponsorship, for instances, seems to lead to success in the South,
while legislative sponsorship - on the surface a seemingly sure fire way to success

-

[:'
,.

ttas been fruitful on only three occasions.

Citizens 1 or taxpayers 1 groups seem to

have some success, especially when they act a co-sponsors with the governor or
:he legislature.
3 ponsorship by party leaders is virtually unknown - a not unexpected situation

when one considers that a person in the game finds changes in the rules usually
:nore of a hinderance than a help.

-..

Professional politicians really cannot be expect-

ed to give warm-hearted endorsement to the neat arranging of hierarchies of what
Bosworth has called "decision points. " Only those politicians who are confident
t:P,at they can use the new hierarchy will support the reorganization move, so, in the

'-f

!inal analysis, the most that one can reasonable seem to expect is short run sponsorihip of compromises in long run organizational plans on the part of party kaders.

lll.

Composition and Organization of the Corr,mission. The personnel of a re-

,rganization commission can, it is sad to say, have had as much to do with the adopion or rejection of the recommended reorganization as can the merits of the plan
tself.

Because of this fact, it is of the utmost importance that the personnel on

'.1e commission be of very high general prestige, and active political influence.

,osworth has put in succinct fashion, ''How many votes can they swing in the
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As

]Ii

7/

.I

lc::gislature, and how effectively can they rally popular support?

11

Following in importance would be the proper political balancing of the mem.,

\

•

bers of the commission to the end that it would not be guilty of being considered
representative of any narrow groups of the state's range of public opinion.

.....

~

•.

With these primary strategic matters taken care of, one can then turn his

-

attention to matters of a tactical nature.

•

For example, legislative members may

be included in the membership of the commission, in the hope that they would, thus,
both become committed to the recommendations

and better able to explain them to

-~

their colleagues.

There is a possible source of danger here, cf course.

There is

. .

:i.lways the danger that the r'Corganizer may be really training his own opposition,
plus the fact that since legislative members are subject to election, the men that

'-

'

l.re chosen are in danger of not having legislative status when the time comes for
them to do their reorgnization chores.
'-.\

\

The device of giving the governor the power to appoint one or more members to

,

;;
, ,

:}le commission serves both to involve him in the plan for reorganization to some

"

;xtent, and, at the same time, serves to let him establish a channel of information
'j

10th to and from the commission, which may help in heading off proposals to which
he chief executive is actively hes tile.

On a more general plane, it may be assumed that the most desirous members

I ,;.

re those who are exceedingly wdl-informed on both the r:;xisting organization of

...\. ,,
. '
.: ...,:

:1e state's administration, and the chances of politic2.l success of possible proposals.
; may be safely assumed that the group to which primary importance has already
-een attached would meet these standards, but from a more specific point of view

1/ Ibid.,

p. 90.
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\,,

•·

.

....

'

.

it might be mentioned that such persons as ex-governors and members of Congress,
if their general reputation has not been too badly smirched, or have not made too

many political enemies may serve as a personnel pool which could materially aid
a reorganization commission by virtu~ of their personal experiences .

..,

'

Such routine considerations of a personal nature as their conduct in the conference situMion, and drafting and writing ability may be taken into account.

it should be repeated that the primary need appears to be prestige and influence and
the careful avoiclance of giving cause for attack on the whole group because of poli-

_,

~-

f

But,

tical imbalance.
•

Size cloes not seem to be a consideration of any importance.

Bosworth

indicates that the corn:l;Diaiom he surveyed ranged from " ... four to forty-one mem8/
bers, with each extreme having som€! success in adoptions. "
There is, it is true,
~

·

a very real risk of unreprescntativeness in the smaller groups, but size, per se,

.,

'

seems a trivial factor.

.

The use of advisory committees would, it appears from the results, be a de-

I

.t

vice that merits the most serious consideration.

In New Hampshire and Oregon,

the advisory committee was used with excellent results - although the use of the
device in the case of Minnesota was not accompanied by any significant adoptions.
Bosworth I s estimate is that

11

•••

the advisory committee was not a decisive factor

9/
in ... success; rather, it was one of several important contributing factors.
IV.

11

Organization, Scope and Method. The prevailing fashion in reorganization

seems to decree that the survey cover as large an area as is possible with the
available funds and powers.

In view of the facts that many states' structures are

8/ Idem.
9/ Ibid., p. 92.
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:,

really in need of extensive reorganization, and that the reorganizers naturally
-<

feel that they should do the best job possible, such an attitude as this is some-

>-

.,."

what to be expected.

...

The question that arises, however, is this; does a reorgani-

zation plan requiring both numerous and important changes impair the chances of
achieving ~change?

,.

The answer seem tc be in the affirmative ..
For example, in all states, save Delaware, in which the legislative response
was negative, the reorganizers had included provisions which required amending
the constitution.

Such a reccrd as this raises seious doubts as to whether admin-

istrative reorganization commissions should concern themselves with the state
constitution.

Alo~, this general line, it appears that it would well behcove com-

missions to severely restrict themselves to the scope cf th0 survey understood by

,
>·

the authorizing body.

As Bosworth puts it,

"Reorganization movements hav_e

10/

'

sufficient hazards without raising the question of the legitimacy of the progeny.

11

Insofar as the organization of the survey is concerned the trend seems to be
definitely away from turning the jub over tc"J a national consulting firm.

The reas-

ons for this seem to condense to three::

t:

1. Possible lack of opportunity for th~ commission to pa,rticipate with a resulting lower level of understanc1.ing cf the recommendations and ability to
communicate them effectively when the time ce;mcs for justifying them.
2. The national firm may easily CNcrlock kcal -::ra<litic:ns and values and
fail to account for commun differences on critical pcints of state politics.
3.

The danger cf cr1.::ating e;ppusiticn by the use of "foreigners. "

A device more to be preferred than using national organizaticns - but one
which is by no means infallible - seems to be the engagement of a professional

10/ Idem.
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i..

.

researcher as director of the survey who has had some experience in the state and

·•

'

who has a generally favorable reputation.

Bosworth points out that eleven of the

fourteen states with more or less favorable adoption results used some variation

'

of such a scheme.
Among the factors ·which appear to have little if any effect on the success of
state reorganization plans are the following:
1. The use of 11 task forces
Hoover Commission,

I

such as were employed by the national

2. The use of specialists for surveys in their special fields of competence.
3.
'

.

'

The widespread use of generalists .

4. The amount of data collected - assuming that it is net merely a
sketchy coverage. As a matter of fact, collecticn of vast amounts of
detailed data seem to be distincly inadvisable.
The problem cf whether to devote attention to minor or mocerate proposals in
addition to major recommendations se(;ms to be a moot point.

Among the argu-

ments against their inclusion is the feeling that adding anything to the major sug~

'

1,

gestions serves only to detract from the primary aims.

On the other hand, to ir.. •

elude them frequently aids in getting the groundwork laid for eliciting a positive

,.- '
,,

- ,.

response from the legislature - it is something that helps to "get the ball rolling,
as it were.

Another consideration is that including proposals of lesser significance

there seems to be a better chance of obtaining some adcpticns.

,.

.....

.,•

11

The motive here

is twofold; the adoptions give a morale boost to the participants in the reorganization attempt, and by getting something on the books future attempts are not prejudices by having to overcome the past history of an utter fiasco.
V.

Presentation of the Report. There appear to be two major considerations

which must be taken into account in the presentation of the report on reorganization .

...
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The two are not completely unrelated; the first revolves around the attempts to
influence the politically powerful people of the state, and the second concerns tht!
attempt to create interest among. the people of the state as a whole .
....

The first must take intc consideraticn keeping the governor informed and
"happy," as well as the agency personnel who arc to become "casualties" in the
reorganization plan - if, indeed, thi1;1 can be managed.

Considerations earlier

presented under the heading of "Sponsorship" anj "Composition" will, cf course,
if properly attended to, greatly forestall difficulties in this area.
The campaign to stimulate public interest is a more complicated problem.
For example, it seems in.advisable t0 fellow the leacl of some states and to provide for the submission of only one repcrt and the dissolution cf the commission

'

upon the submission of that report.

inadvisable, is the case cf Michigan, where there were thirty reports - spread

,,

:

'

out ever a two-year period - with three planned press releases for each individual report.

.

At the other extreme, and see1ningly equally

Neither of these approaches furnished very much in the w2.y of a

.._
)

sensible way to stimuL:tte pubiic interest.
Bosworth's suggestion is certainly mere reasonable and probably more fruit-

<

,

~

ful.

He believes that, " ... releasing the report in chapters over a period cf

i
I .,.

about two weeks has proved an effective w&y of getting large amounts d publicity

11/
\

.,

and of producing public discussion ... " The question cf the desirability cf having the commission work in secrecy
must be considered.

The answer arrived at will be in terms of whether the dan-

ger pressure activities upon commissioners - as news c.f their views becomes
public - is considered tc be greater than the ch2.nce of heading off future troubles.

...

11/

Ibid., p. 95 .
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The possibility that cpen deliberations may give time for the opposition to form

.

'

r

•

seems tc, be counteracted by the very real chance that, in the long run, they may

-·

as easily damage their case as hdp it.

'

If a concentrated campaign for public backing is to be established, it would

l· ...

seem that the matter of timing is very impcrtant.

....

All too frequently, reorganiza-

,

tion reports are submitted just at the beginning cf the legislative session - or after

I ••

they have been under way for some time.

In either case, it is easy for them to be

buried in the welter of controversial issues which someh:.:;w always seem to man-

...

age to appear at session time.

A perfectionist desire on the part of the reorgani-

t_ ,.

..

'•.

zer is sometimes seen here which in effect sacrifices chancee fer adopticn in

'L

favor of prose perfection or rechecking of footn0tes.

'

Adequate time for pubiic

'
consideration is the sine qua

'::"

~

of the campaign for public support.

The actual form of the repc:.::t can, of course, either help or hinder its
chances of obtaining public approval.

While it is certainly not advisable t:o v,ater

the report down in order to make it into a best seller, a careful approad: cari re'

>

\.::_

move the mere objectionable features of "administrative report" style and what
too often passes for "scholarly'' organization.
New Hampshire seems to have had goc:l results with open-forurn MF~cCngs preceeded by a one-day seminar session at the University to familiarb:E :;•orne of
the people who were later to participate in forum discussions with the reorganiza~-

'·

tion scheme.

....

'

,,....
I

It would be well to note here that the people who generally direct surveys

' ,.,

\. \

\

'

1

_
',.....
~J,
i

have what Bosworth has kindly called, " ... disabilities for lea,ling mass political
lZ/
action."
Legislative council directors, university bureaus of research are

~

.
.

\

lZ/ Ibid., p. 96 .

-
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The possibility that cpen deliberations may give time for the opposition to form
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seems to be counteracted by the very real chance that, in the long run, tht:y may

-·

as easily damage their case as hdp it .

....

If a concentrated campaign for public backing is tc be established, it would
seem that the matter of timing is very important.

All tco frequently, reorganiza-

tion reports are submitted just at the beginning cf the legislative session - or after
they have been under way for some time.

In either case, it is easy for them to be

-

buried in the welter of controversial issues which someh:.:;w always seem tu man-

,•
'

age to appear at session time.

..-

zer is sometimes seen here which in effect sacrifices chances for adopticn in

,,
•

.

A perfectionist desire on the part of the reorgani-

\.

favor of prose perfection er rechecking of footnotes.

Adequate time for pubiic

'
consideration is the sine qua
,·

~

of the campaign for public support.

The actual form of the repc:ct can, of course, either help or hinder its
chances of obtaining public approval.

·~ .
'

While it is certainly not advisable t:o water

the report down in order to make it into a best seller, a careful approacb can re_

>

move the mere objectionable features of "administrative report" style and what
too often passes for "scholarly'' organization.
New Hampshire seems to have had goc:l results with open-forurn MF~cCngs preceeded by a one-day seminar session at the University to familiari.zE :,•orne of
the people who were later to participate in forum discussions with the reorganiza'
'

...

...

,....
~--

tion scheme.

i

It would be well to note here that the people who generally direct surveys
have what Bosworth has kindly called,

-~

\

'

11

•••

disabilities for lea,ling mass political

12/

)

action. "

Legislative council directors, university bureaus of research are

...;

.

Y:._/

,

lbid.,p. 96 .
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-

examples of the case in point; they usually, and for excellent reasons, are poli-

'<

'

tically neutral - and wish to stay that way.

Heads of taxpayer or citizens associ-

.,.."
ations are a general exception to this rule, and, as a result, may be better qualifiecl to aid in the campaign to push the survey through to adoption.
It is perhaps regretable - although not too surprising - that the device used
in the case of the national Hoover Commission of allowing the executive to submit
reorganization plans to the legislature for "veto" has been little used in the states.
These plans go into effect if the legislature fails to act against them, and such a

13/
device, which puts" ... inertia and indecision of the side of change ... "-would ap'.,.

pear to help the chances of adoption of the recommendations.

It should be mention-

ed that one reason for its not being used by the states is the very real fear in many

'

jurisdictions that it would be unconstitutional.

,..

A final consideration which seems tc merit thought is one concerning the use
of some provision to keep reorganization movements in existence so that the pro/·

posals may get mere than one hearing.

.1_

be done by a vigorous governor, or by the appointment of an interim committee of

,

th<:: legislature to give further attention to the plan.

,.

,..

"

1,

From the internal point of view, this can

Other alternatives are to as-

sign the task to the legislative council, or, even, to continue the commission in
,..

existence - if its reputation is still relatively clean - and allow it to act as a

~-

source of stimulus for further reorganization measures.
Existing civic groups furnish a ready-made source of continuity and these can
easily be supplemented by citizens' committees such as were established after the
'

'

Hoover Commission report.

, ~·'

The danger of such groups being labeled

as special

interest groups is considerable, but the cases of Michigan and Minnesota seem to

..J

13 1
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.
indicate that they do accomplish some thing - over and above the educational benefits which such a type of organization is apt to confer upon. the community.
VI.

Consideration of Legislators' Views.

While the persons who generally

conduct reorganization surveys seem tc be prt:tty much in agreement on the fundamentals to be sought in reorganization, it is important te, note that there is not so
much agreement on· these concepts arncng legislatcrs.
What is really in conflict here, of course, are on the one hand, the assumptions of the reorganizers, and on the other, the basic premises of some of the
legislators - and differtnce in assumptions cannot be logically reconciled; some
one has to give some ground.

In this case, it seems obvious that the burden for

changing lies not with the legislator but with the would-be reorganizer.
Bosworth has summed up the matter very well.

Here is

• • • an opportunity to try to find the accommodations
to ... various values which can. be arrived at currently in enactable measur(;s. What is arrived at in reorganization proposals may not be neat in pattern and may look te,ward both
integration and particularism, but if the conditions developing professional administration are bettered, that is much
14/
to be preferred to having copies of a rejected 'model' report."
11

No discussion of the required ingredients for a successful reorganization
plan omit this vital point .

...

"Some improvement today - the chance for some more tomorrow'' is an in-

'

\.

finiuitely better slogan fer the reorganizer than "all or nothing."
Reorganization is a political process, and, as such, it cannot leave out the
art of compromise - the essential ingredient of dem0cratic government.

14/

Ibid., p. 99
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